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This paper introduces sector-speci…c externalities in the Heckscher-Ohlin two-country dy-
namic general equilibrium model to show that indeterminacy of the equilibrium path in the
world market can occur. Under certain conditions in terms of factor intensities, there are mul-
tiple equilibrium paths from the same initial distribution of capital in the world market, and
the distribution of capital in the limit di¤ers among equilibrium paths. One equilibrium path
converges to a long-run equilibrium in which the international ranking of factor endowment
ratios di¤ers from the initial ranking; another equilibrium path maintains the initial ranking
and converges to another long-run equilibrium. Since the path realized is indeterminate, so is
the long-run trade pattern. Therefore, the Long-Run Heckscher–Ohlin prediction is vulnerable
to the introduction of externality.
1 Introduction
This study investigates the dynamic behavior of multiple countries’ economic activities in a two-
good, two-factor model in which factors are internationally immobile and countries’ technologies are
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1subject to sector-speci…c external e¤ects.
It has been demonstrated that in a perfect foresight model with many consumers, a competitive
equilibrium path behaves like an optimal growth path; see Becker (1980), Bewley (1982), Yano
(1984), and Epstein (1987). As these results suggest, a perfect foresight equilibrium path may
exhibit the same behavior as in a single consumer model even in a many consumer model such as a
large-country trade model. Nishimura and Yano (1993a, b) studied the interlinkage of business cycles
between large countries in the discrete time model. However, indeterminacy in such a setting has
not been characterized in the existing literature. Indeterminacy means that there exists a continuum
of equilibria starting from the same initial condition, all of which converge to a steady state.
Recently there has been a growing literature on the existence of indeterminate equilibria in dy-
namic general equilibrium economies. While the earlier results on indeterminacy relied on relatively
large increasing returns, Benhabib and Nishimura (1998) and Benhabib, Meng and Nishimura (2000)
showed that in multisector models indeterminacy can arise with constant social returns to scale if
there is a small wedge between private and social returns.
The present paper extends the Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) model by introducing sector-speci…c ex-
ternalities. Given a two (-country) by two (-good) by two (-factor) model of international trade in
which production technologies are subject to constant returns to scale and preferences are homo-
thetic, and in which the di¤erence between the two countries is only in the factor endowment ratio,
the H-O Theorem tells us that each country exports such a good that the abundantly endowed factor
of production is intensively used for producing it.
The H-O Theorem is a result in a static framework. Formulating a two-sector dynamic general
equilibrium model in which capital accumulation is taken into account, Chen (1992) studied the
dynamic version of the H-O model.
In the present paper we introduce sector-speci…c externalities in the dynamic general equilib-
rium model and show that indeterminacy of the equilibrium path in the world market can occur. It
follows that there are multiple equilibrium paths from the same initial distribution of capital in the
world market, and the distribution of capital in the limit di¤ers among equilibrium paths, and one
equilibrium path converges to a long-run equilibrium in which the international ranking of factor
endowment ratios di¤ers from the initial ranking, whereas another equilibrium path maintains the
initial ranking and converges to another long-run equilibrium. Since the path realized is indetermi-
nate, so is the long-run trade pattern. Therefore the Long-Run H-O prediction is vulnerable to the
introduction of externality.
In Section 2 we present the dynamic H-O model in a continuous time model with factor-generated
externalities. In Section 3 we show the existence of a continuum of long-run equilibria. In Section
4 we derive indeterminacy results and discuss implications for the distribution of capital in the
long-run equilibrium. Section 5 concludes.
22 The Dynamic Two-Country Model
We shall formulate the continuous-time version of the dynamic two-country model.
2.1 The production side
Two goods, a consumption good and an investment good, are produced using two factors of pro-
duction, capital and labor. The home and the foreign countries are endowed with the same …xed
amount of labor l and capital stocks k and k¤, respectively. The …rst good is the investment good
and the second good is the consumption good.
Following Benhabib, Meng and Nishimura (2000), we assume Cobb-Douglas technologies which
are constant returns to scale from the social perspective but decreasing returns to scale from the
private perspective due to factor-generated externalities. That is, the production function of good








where ai + ®i + bi + ¯i = 1 and all the parameters are positive. li
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i = 1;2 (3)
From (2) and (3) we can derive the ”virtual” average cost = price condition for each good.
1 = c1(W1;R1) (4a)
p = c2(W2;R2) (4b)
c
1
W (W1;R1)y1 + c
2
W(W2;R2)y2 = l (4c)
c1
R(W1;R1)y1 + c2














ci(Wi;Ri) = 1 ¡ µi: (3) and (4) determine w;r;y1 and y2 for given p and k: Under Cobb-
Douglas technologies and substituting (3) into (4), we see that, as far as µ1 6= µ2; (4a) and (4b) have
a unique pair (w(p); r(p)) for any given p: Logarithmically di¤erentiating the pair with respect to















dpw(p) and r0(p) ´
d
dpr(p): If µ1 > (<)µ2; we say that the consumption good is
capital (labor) intensive from the social perspective. On the other hand, if ¢ ´ a1b2 ¡ a2b1 > (<)0;
then we say that the consumption good is capital (labor) intensive from the private perspective.
The model becomes the standard dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin model if ®i = ¯i = 0; i = 1;2:
Remark 1: As technologies are internationally identical, the same domestic price ( w(p); r(p))
prevails in the foreign country as well. Thus, factor price equalization still holds in a model with ex-
ternalities as long as the social returns are constant. This is an extension of factor price eqaulization
in the literature1.
2.2 The consumption side
The demand for the consumption good, z; is based on the dynamic optimization problem the rep-
resentative household in each country faces. The home household is assumed to maximize the





e¡½tdt; 0 < ´ < 1, ½ > 0 (6)
Note that in the present case the total factor income wl + rk is not necessarily equal to y1 + py2,
because of the presence of externalities. The gap ¦ ´ (y1 + py2) ¡ (wl + rk) can be interpreted
as pro…ts or the remuneration for sector-speci…c factor of production.2 Thus, the home household
maximizes the discounted sum of its utility (6) subject to the ‡ow budget constraint
²
k = y1 + py2 ¡ pz ¡ ±k
= (wl + rk) + ¦ ¡ pz ¡ ±k; (7)




+ ¸[wl + rk + ¦ ¡ pz ¡ ±k] (8)
The necessary conditions for optimality are the …rst-order condition
z¡´ = ¸p; (9)
the di¤erential equation of the co-state variable
²
¸ = ¸[½ + ± ¡ r(p)]; (10)
1We thank Murray Kemp for pointing this out to us. See Kemp and Okawa (1998) concerning recent issues on
factor price equalization.
2Benahabib and Nishimura (1998) assume a …xed cost of entry which makes pro…ts possible. Alternatively,
Nishimura and Shimomura (2000) assume that there exist sector-speci…c factors of production in both sectors and
externalities may be negative and study the case that production technology in each industry is subject to constant
returns to scale from both the private and social perspectives. Under the latter assumption, ¦ is interpreted as the
remuneration of sector-speci…c factors of production, compatible with free entry and exit.




¡½t = 0 (11)
Note that the transversality condition is a necessary condition in the present model.3 We assume
that both countries have the same technologies and preferences. Thus, the foreign household also






















¤(t)e¡½t = 0 (12d)
The asterisk (*) indicates the variables belonging to the foreign country.
Finally, the world market-clearing condition for the consumption good is
z + z
¤ = y2 + y
¤
2 (13)
The market-clearing condition for the investment good is obtained from (7), (12a) and (13).
3 A Long-Run Equilibrium under Incomplete Specialization
We shall prove that the stationary states of the system, (7), (9), (10), (11), (12) and (13), exist
under incomplete specialization. For this purpose we will assume the following.
Assumption 1: The consumption good is labor intensive from the social perspective but capital
intensive from the private perspective, i.e., µ1 < µ2 and ¢ > 0:




Benhabib and Nishimura (1998) derived indeterminacy in their closed economy model under
Assumption 1. Note that Assumption 2 is satis…ed for a su¢ciently small ´:
Since the pair of factor prices (w(p);r(p)) is established in both countries, we also see from (4c)
and (4d) that as long as production is incompletely specialized,4
3See Kamihigashi(2001).
4See Appendix 1 for the derivation of (14).
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Making use of (14), the dynamic general equilibrium model can be written as
²
k =




´ ¡ ±k (15a)
²
k¤ =
r(p)k¤(a1 ¡ a2) ¡ w(p)l(b1 ¡ b2)
¢
¡ p[¸¤p]¡ 1
´ ¡ ±k¤ (15b)
²











r(p)a1(k + k¤) ¡ 2lw(p)b1
p¢
(15e)
If a solution path (k(t);k¤(t);¸(t);¸
¤(t);p(t)) of (15) satis…es the transversality conditions (11) and
(12d), we say that (k(t);k¤(t)) is called an equilibrium from (k(0);k¤(0)): We shall analyze the






(15c) and (15d) mean that ¸¤
¸ ´ m is constant over time. Therefore, for any given positive m; the
solution to the system that is composed of (15a), (15c), (15e), K = k + k¤; (16) and ¸
¤ = m¸ is
equivalent to the system (15).
Theorem 1 (i) In the long-run equilibrium the total capital and the price (Ke;pe) are uniquely
determined. (ii) In the long-run equilibrium there exists a continuum of countries’ capital (ke;ke¤)
at which both economies are incompletely specialized.
Proof. (i) Consider the system of equations
b2w(p)L ¡ a2r(p)K
¢
¡ ±K = 0 (17a)
½+ ± = r(p) (17b)
6First, as far as µ1 6= µ2; for any positive ½ and ±; (17b) uniquely determines the stationary-state p;
say pe: Second, substituting pe into (17a) and solving for K; we obtain the unique stationary-state
K; Ke: That is,
p
e = r
¡1 (½ + ±) ; (18a)
where r¡1(:) is the inverse function of r(:); and
Ke =
b2w(pe)L
½a2 + ±a1b2 + (1 ¡ b1)a2±
> 0 (18b)
The long-run equilibrium in a world trade market is independent of m:
(ii) Given m > 0, (15a) and (15e) yield the following











By substituting (18) into (19), we have
k
e =
















w(pe)Lf½ + ±(1 ¡ b1)g
pef½a2 + ±a1b2 + (1¡ b1)a2±g
(21)
Also, from ¸
¤ = m¸ and ke¤ = K e ¡ ke
ke¤ =




(½ + ±)(a1 ¡ a2) ¡ ±¢
(22)
Fact 1: If m = 1;
ke = ke¤ =
b2w(pe)l.
½a2 + ±a1b2 + (1 ¡ b1)a2±
(23)
(See Appendix 2 for the proof.)
From Fact 1, (20) and (22) the following Fact holds, and it completes the proof.




e and ke do depend on the value of m. Subtracting (22) from (20), we have






´ [1 ¡ m
¡ 1
´]¢
(½ + ±)(a1 ¡ a2) ¡ ±¢
























See Figure 1. (24) means that under (½ + ±)(a1 ¡ a2) ¡ ±¢ < 0; if m = (resp. > and <)1; then the
stationary state is on (resp. below and above) the 45±¡line.
4 Indeterminacy
Under Assumptions 1 and 2, we can obtain the local indeterminacy result.
Theorem 2 There exists a neighborhood of a long-run equilibrium such that from any initial dis-
tribution of capital (k(0);k¤(0)) in that neighborhood there exists a continuum of equilibrium paths.
Moreover, di¤erent equilibrium paths converge to di¤erent long-run equilibria.







¸ = ¸[½ + ± ¡ r(p)] (25b)
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the long-run equilibrium of the system (25) is locally
stable.




there is a two- or three-dimensional stable manifold of the
system (25) in a neighborhood of the stationary state (Ke;ke;¸
e) such that the solution to the above
system converges to the stationary state, that is, for any initial pair of capital stocks (K (0);k (0))
near (Ke;ke); ¸(0) is chosen so that (K (0);k (0); ¸(0)) is on the stable manifold.

























fra1Ke¡wb1Lg ]¡1: By substituting (5), (17b) and (18a), we get ¡ = [´¡1 ¡
e ´
¡1]¡1 > 0 from Assumption 2. Linearizing the above system around the stationary state and











x + [ ra2




























































































[½a2 + ±a1b2 + ±a2(1¡ b1)] > 0 (29)
It follows that the characteristic equation F (x) = 0 has at least two roots with negative real parts.
This fact implies the Lemma.
[Proof of Theorem 2] From Lemma 1, if m is given, then an equilibrium path converges
to a long-run equilibrium. If the value of m varies, an equilibrium path from given initial stock
(k (0);k¤ (0)) and, from (20) and (22), the long-run equilibrium (ke;ke¤) it converges to also varies.
Since m is a ratio of the two jump variables ¸ and ¸
¤; there is no economic mechanism in the decen-
tralized world economy which chooses a particular value of m: This completes the proof of Theorem 2.
5 Dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin Theorem
Let us examine the long-run trade pattern in the long-run equilibrium. First, (21) ensures us that
if m is larger, ¸











with respect to ¸





























´¡1f½a2 + ±a1b2 + ±a2(1 ¡ b1)g
´f(½ + ±)(a1 ¡ a2) ¡ ±¢g
; (30)
which is negative (resp. positive) if (½ + ±)(a1 ¡ a2) ¡ ±¢ < (resp. >)0:
Lemma 3: If (½+±)(a1¡a2)¡±¢ < (resp. >)0, in the long-run equilibrium the capital-abundant
country exports (resp. imports) the consumption good.
Proof. First, notice that if m = 1, the long-run home excess demand for the consumption good,
D2 ¡ S2; is equal to zero. Second, if
(½ + ±)(a1 ¡ a2) ¡ ±¢ < 0;
then (30) is negative, which means that D2 ¡ S2 < (resp. >)0 if m < (resp. >)1: For, (21) tells us
that m is negatively related to ¸
e: Finally, note that (24) implies that m <(resp. >)1 means that
ke > (resp. <)ke¤; i.e., the home (resp. foreign) country is more capital abundant than the foreign
(resp. home) country and exports the consumption good. A parallel argument can be made for the
other case (½ + ±)(a1 ¡ a2) ¡ ±¢ > 0.
Suppose that (½ + ±)(a1 ¡ a2) ¡ ±¢ < 0: See Figure 2. If m = 1; the stationary state is point
E on the line OA with slope 1=2: Theorem 2 asserts that, starting from any initial point E0 in a
neighborhood of the long-run equilibrium E; the world economy converges to E, in which the two
countries have identical factor endowments and no country has comparative advantage to any good.
If m < (resp. >)1; the stationary state is above (resp. below) the line OA like E1 (resp. E2):
The world economy starting from any initial point E0 in a neighborhood of the stationary state,
converges to E1 (resp. E2), in which the home country is more (resp. less) capital abundant, and,
following Lemma 3, it exports (resp. imports) the consumption good. A parallel argument brings a
completely opposite long-run trade pattern for the other case (½ + ±)(a1 ¡ a2) ¡ ±¢ > 0::
Thus, the long-run trade pattern crucially depends on the sign of (½ + ±)(a1 ¡ a2) ¡ ±¢ and
whether m is larger or smaller than 1. However, as we have already mentioned, there is no economic
10mechanism in the decentralized world economy which chooses a particular value of m: Thus, we
arrive at the third theorem.
Theorem 3 There exists a neighborhood of the long-run equilibrium (ke;k¤e) with m = 1 such that
from any initial distribution of capital (k(0);k¤(0)) in that neighborhood there exists an equilibrium
path converging to a long-run equilibrium with m < 1 and another equilibrium converging to a long-
run equilibrium with m > 1: It follows that the initial world distribution of capital does not determine
the long-run trade pattern.
Remark 2: Using a two-country dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin model without externalities, Chen
(1992) showed that the long-run pattern of trade is determined by the initial world distribution of
capital. Our results mean that his long-run Heckscher-Ohlin Theorem does not hold if externalities
are introduced.
6 Concluding Remarks
Let us add a couple of concluding remarks.
First, the indeterminacy results obtained in this paper crucially depend on the presence of ex-
ternalities. Suppose that there is no externality. Then, ¢ = a1 ¡ a2 = µ1 ¡ µ2; which implies that
one root of the characteristic equation, F (x) = 0; is ¡
±¢¡(½+±)(a1¡a2)
¢ = ½ > 0; and that F(0) (
= (29)) is negative. It follows that the characteristic equation (27) has at most one negative root,
which means that for any given positive m the stable manifold is at most one-dimensional. It follows
that in order for the solution to the aforementioned dynamic general equilibrium model to converge
to a stationary state, we have to choose appropriate ¸(0) and m: Thus we have a continuum of
dynamic general equilibrium paths which converge to di¤erent stationary states, where there is no
indeterminacy as far as the world initial distribution of capital is given. That is substantially what
Chen (1992) and Shimomura (1992) discussed.
Second,a large extent of externalities is not necessary for indeterminacy. Benhabib and Nishimura
(p.64, 1998) provides the following numerical example:
a1 = 0:34; ®1 = 0; b1 = 0:66; ¯1 = 0
a2 = 0:3; ®2 = 0:05; b2 = 0:65; ¯2 = 0
Since µ1 ¡ µ2 = ¡0:01 < 0 and ¢ = 0:023 > 0, this example satis…es Assumption 1. It follows
that only a small externality of labor in the production of the consumption good is su¢cient for
indeterminacy in this paper.
Appendix 1: The Derivation of (14)



































































(14) directly follows from (a.2) and (a.3).
Appendix 2: The Proof of Fact 1






±w(pe)lf½+ ±(1 ¡ b1)g
pef½a2 + ±a1b2 + (1 ¡ b1)a2±g
(a.4)
The substitution of (a.4) into (20) and (22) yields
ke = k¤e =
w(pe)l(b1 ¡ b2) +
w(pe)lf½+±(1¡b1)g¢
f½a2+±a1b2+(1¡b1)a2±g
f(½ + ±)(a1 ¡ a2) ¡ ±¢g
=
w(pe)l[(b1 ¡ b2)f½a2 + ±a1b2 + (1¡ b1)a2±g+ f½ + ±(1¡ b1)g¢]
f(½+ ±)(a1 ¡ a2) ¡ ±¢gf½a2 + ±a1b2 + (1 ¡ b1)a2±g
=
w(pe)l£
f(½ + ±)(a1 ¡ a2) ¡ ±¢gf½a2 + ±a1b2 + (1¡ b1)a2±g
where
£ ´ (b1 ¡ b2)(½ + ±)a2 + (b1 ¡ b2)±¢ + f½ + ±(1¡ b1)g¢
= (b1 ¡ b2)(½ + ±)a2 ¡ b2±¢ + (½ + ±)¢
= (½ + ±)f(b1 ¡ b2)a2 + (a1b2 ¡ a2b1)g ¡ b2±¢
= (½ + ±)(a1 ¡ a2)b2 ¡ b2±¢






½a2 + ±a1b2 + (1 ¡ b1)a2±
;
as was to be proved.
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